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1    Introduction 
 
It is often argued that financial innovation in the form of creating new in- 
struments and opening up new markets is desirable because it creates op- 
portunities for diversification and potentially promotes liquidity. Although 
this argument appears to be a powerful one, practical experience of financial 
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2 Center for Financial Studies liberalization such as the introduction of new instruments and the creation of
new markets has not always been positive, particularly in emerging markets.
Such changes have often led to ﬁnancial crises.
This paper is concerned with credit risk transfer. This has existed for
many years, but recent innovations such as credit derivatives have increased
t h ea m o u n tt h a ti to c c u r s .T a b l e1( B I S ,2 0 0 3 )s h o w st h es i z eo fc r e d i tr i s k
transfer markets using various instruments from 1995 to 2002. It can be seen
that the use of all types of credit risk transfer has increased substantially.
The growth has been particularly rapid in credit derivatives and collateralized
debt obligations. Studies by the British Bankers Association (BBA, 2002)
and Fitch (2003) indicate that banks are the major participants both as
buyers and sellers in the markets for credit risk transfer. Overall banks are
net buyers and insurance companies are net sellers.
We show how ﬁnancial innovation in the form of new credit risk transfer
instruments can lead to beneﬁcial diversiﬁcation in some circumstances but to
a fall in welfare through the creation of contagion in others. This argument is
developed in a model with a banking sector and an insurance sector based on
Allen and Gale (2005a). Both sectors are competitive and can buy risk-free
short and long assets. The dierence between the two sectors is that banks
can make risky loans to ﬁrms, while insurance companies insure another
group of ﬁrms whose assets may be damaged. Also, banks raise funds in the
form of deposits and capital, while insurance companies have as funds only
the premiums they receive from the ﬁrms they insure.
We start by considering the case where all banks face the same demand
for liquidity from their depositors. When both sectors are autarkic so they
operate without links, the banks and insurance companies hold dierent as-
sets and only the insurance sector is subject to systemic risk. If the return
on the risk-free long asset is low compared to the return on the risky loans,
banks invest in the short term asset to repay their early depositors and in
risky loans. Insurance companies oer partial insurance, and invest the pre-
miums they initially receive in the short asset. Since there is aggregate risk
in the insurance sector, insurance companies may not be able to repair all
damaged assets and so go bankrupt. This systemic risk is benign in the sense
that there are no deadweight costs associated with it.
In the case where all banks face the same demands for liquidity from their
depositors, credit risk transfer between the banking and insurance sectors is
beneﬁcial. Speciﬁcally, it allows the risk the two sectors face to be shared
without creating contagion because the two sectors still hold dierent assets.
2As in autarky, banks invest in the short asset and in risky loans. By contrast,
insurance companies now also hold the long asset to facilitate their ability
to transfer risks; and they are forced to liquidate it when the ﬁrms they are
insuring have high losses. The price they receive for the long asset is very
low to ensure there are adequate incentives for providing liquidity to the
market. This implies that insurance companies may still not be able to pay
all ﬁrms with damaged assets and go bankrupt. Importantly though, this
low price does not aect the banking sector because banks do not use the
long asset. Credit risk transfer is then desirable because its only eect is to
allow diversiﬁcation of risk between the banking and the insurance sectors.
The eect of introducing the credit risk transfer diers when banks face
idiosyncratic liquidity risk. In this case, some banks have a large number of
e a r l yc o n s u m e r sw h ow i t h d r a wa tt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ed a t ea n do t h e rb a n k sh a v e
a large number of late consumers who withdraw at the ﬁnal date. Banks can
hedge this risk by holding the risk-free long asset and trading it in a liquid
market. If a bank has a large number of early consumers, it can sell the
long asset to banks with a large number of late consumers. Since there is
assumed to be no aggregate liquidity risk, in the autarkic equilibrium only
insurance companies face systemic risk. As before, they invest the premiums
they receive in the short asset, and go bankrupt when the ﬁrms they insure
experience high losses. The banking sector experiences no crises and banks
hedge their idiosyncratic liquidity risk using the market for long term assets.
However, because banks now hold the long term asset, introducing credit
risk transfer can be damaging because of the possibility of contagion. The
insurance sector again uses the long asset to allow it to undertake its credit
risk transfers eectively. When insurance companies face a shock where their
losses are high, they will be forced to liquidate the long asset. This liquida-
tion forces down the price. The reason is that there is “cash in the market
pricing”. The buyers optimally use all of their liquidity and sellers supply all
of their holdings. The price is the ratio of the two. If the quantity sold goes
up, the price goes down. This fall in price now aects the banking industry
as banks are using the long asset to hedge their idiosyncratic liquidity risk.
There is then the possibility of damaging contagion of systemic risk to the
banking sector. Although taking prices as given it is optimal to engage in
credit risk transfer, the equilibrium with credit risk transfer can be Pareto
worse than the autarkic equilibrium. The systemic risk is costly since banks’
loans cannot be liquidated for a positive amount and the contagion interferes
with the risk sharing between banks with early and late consumers through
3the interbank market.
There is a small but growing literature on credit risk transfer. The ﬁrst
strand of this literature considers the impact of credit risk transfer on the al-
location of resources when there is asymmetric information. Morrison (2003)
shows that a market for credit derivatives can destroy the signalling role of
bank debt and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result. He sug-
gests that disclosure requirements for credit derivatives can help oset this
eect. Nicolo and Pelizzon (2004) show that if there are banks with dier-
ent abilities to screen borrowers then good banks can signal their type using
ﬁrst-to-default basket contracts that are often used in practice. These in-
volve a payment to the protection buyer if any of a basket of assets defaults.
Only protection sellers with very good screening abilities will be prepared to
use such contracts. Chiesa (2004) considers a situation where banks have a
comparative advantage in evaluating and monitoring risks but limited risk
bearing capacity. Credit risk transfer improves e!ciency by allowing the
monitored debt of large ﬁrms to be transferred to the market while banks
can use their limited risk bearing capacity for loans to small businesses. Arp-
ing (2004) considers the change in lender and borrower incentives when credit
risk is transferred. He shows that lenders will be more willing to call loans
but will be less willing to provide monitoring eort. Eective incentives can
be provided by structuring the maturity structure of credit protection appro-
priately. Parlour and Plantin (2005) consider the eect of credit risk transfer
on relationship banking. Banks can receive proprietary information about
loan quality or a shock to their discount factor. Either can cause them to try
to transfer the risk and this creates an adverse selection problem. Parlour
and Plantin identify when credit risk transfer markets arise and whether this
is e!cient. In contrast to these papers, our paper focuses on the situation
where there is symmetric information and shows how credit risk transfer can
improve the allocation of resources through better risk sharing across sectors.
The second part of the literature focuses on the stability aspects of credit
risk transfer. Wagner and Marsh (2004) consider the transfer of risk between
banking and non-banking sectors. They ﬁnd that the transfer of risk out
of a relatively fragile banking sector leads to an improvement in stability.
Wagner (2005a) develops a model where credit risk transfer improves the
liquidity of bank assets. However, this can increase the probability of crises
by increasing the risks that banks are prepared to take. Wagner (2005b)
shows that the increased portfolio diversiﬁcation possibilities introduced by
credit risk transfer can increase the probability of liquidity-based crises. The
4reason is that the increased diversiﬁcation leads banks to reduce the amount
of liquid assets they hold and increase the amount of risky assets. In contrast
to these contributions, in our paper the focus is on idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks and their interaction with credit risk transfer in creating contagion
between banking and insurance systems.
The paper also contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial innovation. Hart
(1974) shows that with incomplete markets, the introduction of a new market
c a nl e a dt oaP a r e t or e d u c t i o ni nw e l f a r e . S i n c et h e nan u m b e ro fa u t h o r s
have shown that ﬁnancial innovation can be bad for welfare (see, e.g., New-
bery and Stiglitz, 1982; Allen and Gale, 1990; Elul, 1995; and Cass and
Citanna, 1998). The most closely related paper in this context is Duee and
Zhou (2001). They show that credit risk transfer can cause the collapse of
other risk sharing mechanisms such as the loan-sale market, and this can re-
sult in a reduction in welfare. The credit risk transfer market attracts some
participants from the loan-sale market and this worsens the adverse selection
problem in the latter to such an extent that it collapses. In contrast, our
paper shows that credit risk transfer can cause contagion and the spread in
systemic risk makes everybody worse o.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model
with a banking and an insurance sector. Section 3 shows how credit risk
transfer can improve welfare relative to the autarkic equilibrium through
better risk sharing. Section 4 describes the detrimental eect of credit risk
transfer when banks are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Section 5
contains concluding remarks.
2T h e m o d e l
The model is based on the analyses of crises and systemic risk in Allen and
Gale (1998, 2000a-c, 2004a-b, 2005b) and Gale (2003, 2004), and particularly
in Allen and Gale (2005a). A standard model of intermediation is extended
by adding an insurance sector. Since the risks faced by the insurance sector
are not perfectly correlated with the risks faced by the banking sector, there
is scope for diversiﬁcation. This is the basic motive for credit risk transfer.
There are three dates w =0 >1>2 and a single, all-purpose good that can
be used for consumption or investment at each date. There are two sectors in
the ﬁnancial system, the banking sector and the insurance sector. Each sector
consists of a large number of competitive ﬁrms and the lines of business of
5banks and insurance companies do not overlap. This is a strong assumption
but a necessary one, since the combination of insurance and intermediation
activities in a single ﬁnancial institution would obviate the need for credit
risk transfer outside the institution.
There are two securities, one short and one long. The short security is
represented by a storage technology: one unit at date w produces one unit at
date w +1 . The long security is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale
investment technology that takes two periods to mature: one unit invested in
the long security at date 0 produces UA1 units of the good at date 2 (and
nothing at date 1). These securities represent the investment opportunities
that banks and insurance companies ha v ei nc o m m o n .I np r a c t i c et h e r ea r e
many such securities, for example, government and other bonds.
In addition to the short and long securities, banks and insurance compa-
nies have distinct direct-investment opportunities. Banks can make loans to
ﬁrms which succeed with probability . More precisely, each ﬁrm borrows
o n eu n i ta td a t e0 and invests in a risky venture that produces EK units of
t h eg o o da td a t e2 if successful and EO if unsuccessful. There is assumed to
be an inﬁnite supply of such ﬁrms, so that banks take all the surplus on the
loan market.
Banks raise funds from depositors, who have one unit of the good at date
0 and none at dates 1 and 2. Depositors are uncertain of their preferences:
with probability  they are early consumers, who only value the good at date
1 and with probability 1   they are late consumers, who only value the
good at date 2. Uncertainty about time preferences generates a preference for
liquidity and a role for the intermediaries as providers of liquidity insurance.
The utility of consumption is represented by the function X(f) with the
usual properties. We normalize the number of consumers to 1.S i n c eb a n k s
compete to raise deposits, they choose the contracts they oer to maximize
depositors’ expected utility. If they failed to do so, another bank could step
in and oer a better contract to attract away all their customers.
Insurance companies sell insurance to a large number of ﬁrms, whose
m e a s u r ei sn o r m a l i z e dt oo n e .E a c hﬁrm has one unit of endowment at date
0 and owns an asset that produces D units of the good at date 2.W i t h
probability  the asset suers some damage at date 1.U n l e s st h i sd a m a g e
is repaired, at a cost of , the asset becomes worthless and will produce
nothing at date 2.T h u s , ﬁrms can decide to buy insurance against the
probability of incurring the damage in exchange for a premium at date 0.
The insurance companies collect the premiums and invest them in the short
6security at date 0 in order to pay the ﬁrms’ damages at date 1.T h eo w n e r s
of the ﬁrms consume at date 2 and have a utility function Y (F) with the
usual properties. Similarly to the banks, the insurance companies operate in
competitive markets and thus maximize the expected utility of the owners of
the ﬁrms. If they did not do this, another ﬁrm would enter and attract away
all their customers.
Finally, we introduce a class of risk neutral investors who can provide
capital to the insurance and banking sectors. Investors have a large (un-
bounded) amount of the good Z0 a se n d o w m e n ta td a t e0 and nothing at
dates 1 and 2; and provide capital to the intermediary through the contract
h =( h0>h 1>h 2),w h e r eh0  0 denotes an investor’s supply of capital at date
w =0 > and hw  0 denotes consumption at dates w =1 >2. Although investors
are risk neutral, we assume that their consumption must be non-negative
at each date. Otherwise, they could absorb all risk and provide unlimited
liquidity. Investors’ utility function is then deﬁned as
x(h0>h 1>h 2)=Z0  h0 + h1 + h2,
where the constant  is the investors’ opportunity cost of funds. This can
represent their time preference or their alternative investment opportunities
that are not available to the other agents in the model. We assume AUso
that it is not worthwhile for investors to just invest in assets at date 0.T h i s
has two important implications. First, since investors have a large endow-
ment at date 0 and the capital market is competitive, there will be excess
supply of capital and they will just earn their opportunity cost. Secondly,
the fact that investors have no endowment (and non-negative consumption)
at dates 1 and 2 implies that their capital must be converted into assets in
order to provide risk sharing at dates 1 and 2.
For the purposes of illustrating the scope for diversiﬁcation, the structure
of uncertainty is one that allows for some diversiﬁcation and some aggregate
risk. This is achieved by assuming that the proportions of failing ﬁrms for
the banking sector and of damaged ﬁrms for the insurance sector equal the
probabilities  and , respectively, and that these probabilities are them-
selves random. In particular,  and  take two values each, K and O and
K and O.N o t e a l s o t h a t  and  are independent so that we have four
possible states, (K> K), (K> O), (O> K), (O> O).W ed e n o t et h e ms i m -
ply as KK>KO>OK> and OO> respectively. This simple structure is enough
to illustrate the main points, and nothing would change with a more general
7structure. All uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of date 1.B a n k sd i s -
cover whether loans will pay o o rn o ta td a t e2. Depositors learn whether
they are early or late consumers. Insurance companies learn which ﬁrms have
damaged assets.
3B e n e ﬁcial credit risk transfer
The purpose of this section is to show that credit risk transfer can be ben-
eﬁcial as it allows risk sharing across sectors. This is demonstrated using
numerical examples. The ﬁrst case considered is when the banking sector
and the insurance sector are autarkic and operate separately.
3.1 The autarkic banking sector
The return on the long asset is U =1 =25. Depositors become early consumers
with probability  =0 =5 and have utility function X(f)=Oq(f).L o a n s
pay o EK =1 =75 with probability K =1in state K,w h i c ho c c u r sw i t h
probability 0=7;a n dEO =0 =75 with probability 1  O =1in state O,
which occurs with probability 0=3. The expected payo o nl o a n si st h e n
0=7 × 1=75 + 0=3 × 0=75 = 1=45.
3.1.1 No capital
In order to understand the role of capital in the model, it is helpful to start
with the case where there is no capital. Since banks are competitive, they
choose the contracts they oer to maximize depositors’ expected utility. At
date 0 banks choose how to split their 1 unit of deposits investing { units in
the short term asset, | units in the long asset, and } units in loans. Since
ex ante all banks are identical, they choose {>|> and } to solve the following
problem:
Max 0=5X (f1)+0 =5[0=7X (f2K)+0 =3X (f2O)] (1)
subject to













Each bank has 1 unit of depositors and 0=5 of them become early con-
sumers. The ﬁrst term in the objective function represents the utility X (f1)
of the 0=5 early consumers. The bank uses the proceeds of the short term as-
set to provide them with a level of consumption f1 = {@0=5. The second term
represents the 0=5 depositors who become late consumers. With probability
0=7 the bank’ loans pay o EK and the late consumers receive consumption
f2K =( |U+}EK)@0=5= With probability 0=3 the banks’ loans pay o EO and
t h el a t ec o n s u m e r sr e c e i v ec o n s u m p t i o nf2O =( |U+}EO)@0=5= The constraint
(2) is the budget constraint at date 0.
It can be shown using direct numerical hill-climbing techniques that the
optimal solution in this case is
{ =0 =5>|=0 >}=0 =5>
f1 =1 >f 2K =1 =75>f 2O =0 =75>
HX =0 =153=
Banks use the short term asset to provide consumption to the early con-
sumers. It is not worth them using the long asset. The expected return of
1=45 on loans is su!ciently greater than the return of 1=25 on the long asset
that banks put nothing in the latter. Note also that the late consumers have
an expected consumption at date 2 equal to Hf2 =0 =7f2K +0 =3f2O =1 =45.
As we will see shortly, this will be lower when we introduce capital.
3.1.2 With capital
Next consider what happens when there are investors who can make an
amount of capital h0 available to the banks. Their opportunity cost for pro-
viding this equity capital is  =1 =5. Since investors are indierent between
consumption at date 1 and date 2,i ti so p t i m a lt os e th1 =0 ,i n v e s th0 in
the long asset or loans, and make a payout h2 at date 2 to investors.
Banks’ optimization problem is the same as before except now the budget
constraint at date 0 is
{ + | + } =1+h0,( 6 )
9rather than (2). This reﬂects the fact that, in addition to the depositors’
endowment of 1, banks can now also invest the investors’ contribution of h0.
Banks have to pay h2 at date 2 to investors to compensate for supplying
the capital. It is best to make this payment in state K when loans pay o
EK and depositors’ marginal utility of consumption is lowest. Thus, (4) is
replaced by
f2K =
|U+ }EK  h2
0=5
.( 7 )
In order for the risk neutral investors to be willing to supply the capital, h0,
they must receive an expected payo equal to their opportunity cost h0=
Since h2 is paid when state K occurs, which happens 0=7 of the time, it is
necessary that
h0 =0 =7h2.( 8 )
The optimal solution in this case is
{ =0 =5>|=0 >}=0 =818>h 0 =0 =318>h 2 =0 =682>
f1 =1 >f 2K =1 =5>f 2O =1 =227>
HX =0 =173=
Comparing this to the previous optimum without capital allows us to
see the role of capital. The providers of capital are risk neutral. They only
receive a payment h2 when banks’ loans pay o EK =1 =75. I nr e t u r nf o r
this payment, investors provide capital of h0 =0 =318> and banks can make
more loans. Again it is not worth for banks investing anything in the long
asset because its payo is too low compared to the expected payo of the
loans. Overall, capital allows banks to reduce the variance of the payments
to depositors in the second period. Instead of f2K =1 =75> and f2O =0 =75
without capital, depositors now receive f2K =1 =5> and f2O =1 =227= In eect,
the late consuming depositors are sharing risk with the investors. This risk
sharing comes at a cost, however. The opportunity cost of the investors
providing the capital is  =1 =5> which is greater than the expected return
on loans of 1=45. The expected consumption Hf2 =0 =7f2K +0 =3f2O of the
late consuming depositors is thus reduced from 1=45 to 1=418= Their expected
utility, though, is increased from 0=153 to 0=173= T h ef a c tt h a tt h eo p po r t u n i t y
cost of the capital provided by the investors is above the return on loans
means that capital is costly and is only used for partial rather than complete
risk sharing.
103.2 The autarkic insurance sector
The insurance sector is considered next on its own. For simplicity, we consider
h e r et h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sn om a r k e tf o rl i q u i d a t i n gt h el o n ga s s e t .I tc a nb e
shown, however, that at the equilibrium prices that would ensure a supply of
liquidity, the autarkic equilibrium in the insurance sector would be unaltered
if such a market was included.
As explained above, insurance companies oer insurance to ﬁrms against
the probability that their assets are damaged at date 1 a n dn e e dt ob er e -
paired in order to produce D at date 2. In our example, the probability
of such damage is K =0 =5 in state K, which occurs with probability 0=9,
and O =1in state O, which occurs with probability 0=1. Assets produce
D =1 =35 at date 2 and repairing them when damaged costs  =1at date 1.
The utility function of the owners of the ﬁrm is Y (f)=Oq(f)=
The insurance industry is competitive so the insurance companies do not
earn any proﬁts. Similarly to the banks, they maximize the expected utility
of the owners of the ﬁrms they insure. They can oer partial or full insurance
to ﬁrms. If they oer partial insurance, they charge a premium equal to 0=5
at date 0 to the ﬁrms so that the latter still have another 0=5 of their initial
endowment to invest. Firms will ﬁnd it optimal to invest this 0=5 in the long
asset rather than the short asset since their owners do not consume until date
2. In order to have funds to repair the damaged assets, insurance companies
must invest in the short asset so that they have liquidity at date 1.I ns t a t eK
they need funds K =0 =5 at date 1 for claims to repair the damaged assets
so they put [ =0 =5 in the short asset and \ =0in the long asset. This
means they have funds of 0=5 and can pay all the claims to repair the damaged
assets. With insurance the ﬁrms’ assets will pay o D for sure in this state.
Given this and the fact that the ﬁrms’ owners invest 0=5 in the long asset, their
consumption in state K is F2K = D+0=5U =1 =975. In state O the insurance
companies receive claims of O =1 = They don’t have su!cient funds to pay
these so they go bankrupt. With partial insurance there is thus systemic risk
in the insurance industry. When insurance companies go bankrupt, their
assets are distributed equally among the claimants. The ﬁrms receive 0=5
from the insurance companies’ liquidation of the short term assets, but can’t
repair their assets so these produce nothing. The consumption of the owners
of the ﬁrms is therefore F2O =0 =5+0 =5U =1 =125= Their expected utility
with partial insurance is then
HYsduwldo =0 =9Y (D +0 =5U)+0 =1Y (0=5+0 =5U)=0 =624=
11If the insurance companies oered full insurance, they would charge 1 at
date 0= They would invest all of this in the short term asset and could meet
all of their claims in both states. Now, however, the ﬁrms’ owners would
have nothing left over at date 0 and would hold no investments of their own.
In state K the insurance companies would only use 0=5 of their assets at date
1 to repair their customers’ machines and would have 0=5 left over. Since the
industry is competitive they would pay this out to the insured ﬁrms. Hence
F2K = D+0=5=1 =85= In state O all the insurance companies funds are used
to repair their customers’ machines and F2O = D= In this case the expected
utility of the ﬁrms’ owners would be
HYixoo =0 =9Y (D +0 =5) + 0=1Y (D)=0 =584=
Partial insurance is thus superior to full insurance. It can readily be
checked that partial insurance is also better for the ﬁrms than self insurance.
Thus the optimal scheme for the insurance industry is to partially insure
ﬁrms and oer the owners of the ﬁr m sa ne x p e c t e dc o n s u m p t i o na td a t e2
equal to HF2 =0 =9F2K +0 =1F2O =1 =890.T h eﬁrms put the remaining part
of their endowment in the long asset. There is no point in the insurance
company holding the long asset because there is no market for it when they
go bankrupt. If a market is included as explained below, then it will still not
be optimal for the insurance companies to hold the long asset because there
is a liquidation cost while if the ﬁrms hold it directly there is none.
There is no role for capital in the insurance sector so their capital is
H0 =0 . Capital providers charge a premium to cover their opportunity cost
 =1 =5. Their funds would have to be invested in the short asset since it is
not optimal to hold any long assets. There are already potentially enough
funds from customers for insurance companies to hold more of the short asset
but it is not e!cient to do so. There is a small probability of a large loss and
it is not worth holding enough short assets to guard against this contingency
given the high opportunity cost of holding short assets. If the short assets
are funded by capital and there is a premium to be paid for the capital it is
even less e!cient. Capital will not be used in the insurance industry unless
there are regulations forcing this.
3.3 Credit risk transfer
In the previous sections the banking and insurance sectors have been consid-
ered in isolation. We now consider them together, and introduce the possi-
12bility for the long term asset to be liquidated on a market at date 1.S i n c e
the risks in the two sectors are independent, we have four possible states for
the probabilities  and ,w h i c hw ed e s c r i b ea sKK, KO, OK and OO.T h e
payos in these four states are as follows.
Table 1
State Bank Late Insurance Firms Probability
loans depositors claims (%)
KK 1=75 1=55 0 1 =975 0=7 × 0=9=0 =63
KO 1=75 1=51 0 0 1 =125 0=7 × 0=1=0 =07
OK 0=75 1=227 50 1=975 0=3 × 0=9=0 =27
OO 0=75 1=227 100 1=125 0=3 × 0=1=0 =03
It can be seen that the late consuming depositors have dierent payos
in states KK and KO compared to states OK and OO= Similarly the payos
to the owners of the ﬁrms being insured are dierent in states KK and OK
as compared to KO and OO.T h e s ed i erences mean that there is potential
for risk sharing between the two groups. Credit risk transfer between the
two sectors represents one way of achieving this risk sharing.
For simplicity the focus is on a particularly simple form of risk transfer.
Banks make a payment KO to the insurance companies in state KO;a n d
the insurance companies make a payment OK to the banks in state OK.
Notice that markets are still not complete with this credit risk transfer. For
simplicity it is assumed that the banks’ depositors obtain the surplus from
the credit risk transfer. The insurance companies will compete to provide the
credit risk transfer that maximizes the utility of the banks’ depositors at the
lowest cost to themselves. In equilibrium they will obtain their reservation
utility, which is what they would receive in autarky.
How can such transfers be funded? In state KO banks’ loans pay o EK
so they have a large amount of funds and can simply transfer some of these
to the insurance companies. Banks still maximize the expected utility of
depositors (1) subject to the constraints (6) and (8). The only dierence is
that now they have to pay KO in state KO to the insurance companies, and
receive OK in state OK. Thus, the per capita consumption of late consumers
in these two states becomes
f2KO =




{ + |U+ }EO + OK
0=5
.
13The problem is more complex for the insurance companies. In state OK
the owners of the ﬁrms that insure their assets with the insurance companies
have plenty of funds. However, the companies themselves do not. They are
only holding enough to meet claims at date 1 in states KK and OK.I n
order for them to be able to make a payout on the credit risk transfer to the
banks at date 2 in state OK they must hold extra assets. They must charge
the ﬁrms more initially and the ﬁrms will consequently have to reduce their
holdings of the long asset. If the insurance companies hold the short asset
there is an opportunity cost of U  1 in all states. Let the transfer from
the banks to the insurance companies in state KO be KO, and the amount
invested in the short asset to fund the transfer from the insurance companies
to the banks in state OK be OK = OK. The opportunity cost in each state
is OK(U  1). The expected utility of the insured ﬁrms’ owners, which is
ultimately the objective function of the insurance companies, is equal with
partial insurance to
HYvkruw =0 =63Y (D + OK +( 0 =5  OK)U)
+0=07Y (0=5+OK + KO +( 0 =5  OK)U)
+0=27Y (D +( 0 =5  OK)U)
+0=03Y (0=5+OK +( 0 =5  OK)U)=
To see this, note that the ﬁrms pay an insurance premium 0=5+KO to
the insurance companies who invest it in the short asset. The ﬁrms then
invest the amount that remains after they have paid the insurance premium,
(0=5OK)> in the long asset, and this pays o (0=5OK)U in every state.
In state KK, which occurs with probability 0=63> all the machines that are
damaged are repaired using 0=5 of the proceeds from the short asset. The
ﬁrms receive D from their machines. There are no credit risk payments so
the insurance companies pay the proceeds of their investment in the short
asset, OK,o u tt ot h eﬁrms (since the insurance market is competitive). In
state KO> which occurs with probability 0=07> the insurance companies have
all their customers claim and go bankrupt. They are unable to repair any
machines and distribute the 0=5+OK that was invested in the short asset to
their customers. They receive a credit risk transfer payment of KO from the
banks which they also pay out to their customers. In state OK,w h i c ho c c u r s
with probability 0=27> everything is the same as in state KK,e x c e p tt h a t
the insurance companies must pay out OK = OK as a credit risk transfer
payment to the banks instead of to their customers. Finally in state OO,
14which occurs with probability 0=03> everything is the same as in state KO
except there is no payment from the banks.
It turns out that in the example considered it is not possible to keep the
insurance companies at their reservation level of utility HY =0 =624 and make
the banks better o if the insurance companies fund the credit risk transfer
w i t ht h es h o r ta s s e t .T h i si st h ec a s ef o ra l lf e a s i b l ev a l u e so fOK and KO
and the corresponding optimal choices by banks and insurance companies=
The opportunity cost in each state, OK(U  1)> from investing in the short
asset rather than in the long asset is simply too large for credit risk transfer
to be worthwhile.
If instead of investing OK in the short asset, the insurance companies
invest cOK in the long asset so OK = cOKU, there would not be an opportu-
nity cost cOK(U  1) in every state. On the other hand, however, there is a
cost in states KO and OO, when the insurance companies go bankrupt and
must sell the cOK l o n ga s s e ta td a t e1 for a price SKO = SOO = SLO.T h e
expected utility of the insured ﬁrms’ owners in this case is
HYorqj =0 =63Y (D + cOKU +( 0 =5  cOK)U))
+0=07Y (0=5+cOKSLO + KO +( 0 =5  cOK)U)
+0=27Y (D +( 0 =5  cOK)U))
+0=03Y (0=5+cOKSLO +( 0 =5  cOK)U)=
Now the ﬁrms pay an insurance premium 0=5+cKO to the insurance companies
who invest [ =0 =5 i nt h es h o r ta s s e ta n d\ = cKO in the long asset. The
ﬁrms then invest the assets that remain after they have paid the insurance
premium, (0=5cOK)> i nt h el o n ga s s e t ,a n dt h i sp a y so  (0=5cOK)U in every
state. In state KK, all the machines that are damaged are repaired using the
0=5 from the short asset. The ﬁrms receive D from their machines. There
are no credit risk payments so the insurance companies pay the proceeds of
their investment in the long asset, cOKU, out to the ﬁrms. In state KO>
the insurance companies have all their customers claim and go bankrupt.
They are unable to repair the assets and distribute the 0=5 that was invested
in the short asset together with the cOKSLO they get from liquidating their
holdings of the long asset to their customers. They receive a credit risk
transfer payment of OK from the banks which they also pay out to their
customers. In state OK, everything is the same as in state KK,e x c e p tt h a t
the insurance companies must pay out OK = cOKU as a credit risk transfer
payment to the banks instead of to their customers. Finally, in state OO,
15everything is the same as in state KO except there is no payment from the
banks.
In order to ﬁnd the optimal credit risk transfer in this case, it is ﬁrst
necessary to ﬁnd SLO.T h e ﬁrst issue to consider is that somebody must
supply liquidity to this market. In other words, some agents must hold the
short asset between dates 0 and 1 in order to have the funds to purchase the
long asset which the insurance companies supply to the market when they go
bankrupt in states KOand OO. If nobody held liquidity, then there would be
nobody on the other side of the market and the price of the long asset would
fall to zero at date 1. This would not be an equilibrium though, because by
holding a very small amount of cash somebody would be able to enter and
buy up all the supplied long asset and make a large proﬁt.
In our framework, the group supplying liquidity is the investors who pro-
vide the capital to the banks. In order to be willing to hold this liquidity,
they must be able to recoup their opportunity cost. Since in states KK and
OK when there is no liquidation of assets they end up holding the short asset
throughout, they must make a signiﬁcant proﬁt in states KO and OO when
the insurance companies go bankrupt. In other words, the price of the long
asset must be low in these states.
To ﬁnd the price SLO that allows investors to just recover their opportunity
cost  =1 =5, suppose they invest 1 in the short term asset at date 0.A s
mentioned, in states KK and OK> which occur with total probability 0=9,
they will hold the short term asset throughout and receive 1 at date 2.I n
states KO and OO, which occur with total probability 0=1, investors will be
able to buy 1@SLO of the long asset at date 1 and receive (1@SLO) × U =
(1@SLO) × 1=25 at date 2. The price SLO must then satisfy
0=9 × 1+0 =1 ×
1
SLO
× 1=25 = 1=5,
so that
SLO =0 =208=
We also need to ﬁnd the price of the long asset SKK = SOK = SLK at
date 1 in states KK and OK.T h i si ss i m p l ye q u a lt o
SLK = U =1 =25=
The reason for this is straightforward. In states KK and OK there is no
bankruptcy and no sale of assets. A price equal to U ensures that the in-
vestors will hold cash and the insurance companies will hold the long asset
16between dates 1 and 2 so markets will clear. If SLK ?Uthe investors would
want to buy the long asset since it would provide a higher return than cash.
If SLK AUthe insurance companies would sell the long asset and hold cash
until date 2. The only price at which both the long asset and cash will be
held between dates 1 and 2, which is necessary for equilibrium, is SLK = U=
Given this pricing of the long asset it can be shown that the optimal
values for the transfers and cOK are
KO =0 =17>c OK =0 =037>OK = cOKU =0 =046=
When the insurance companies go bankrupt in states KO and OO> they
are forced to liquidate the 0=037 of the long asset they hold to ﬁnance the
credit risk transfer. In order for the market to clear at SLO =0 =208,t h e
investors must hold 0=037 × 0=208 = 0=008 in the short asset.
Table 2 gives the full equilibrium with credit risk transfer and also in-
cludes the full equilibrium with autarky for the purpose of comparison. It
can be seen that the overall ee c to fc r e d i tr i s kt r a n s f e ri nt h i sc a s ei st o
make a Pareto improvement in welfare. Credit risk transfer represents a way
of sharing risk between the sectors. It is an alternative to bank capital. Since
bank capital is a relatively expensive way of sharing risk because of investors’
high opportunity cost, the ee c to fc r e d i tr i s kt r a n s f e ri st ol o w e rt h ea m o u n t
of capital banks use. With autarky banks use 0=318 unit of capital, while
with credit risk transfer they reduce this to 0=266 and consequently reduce
their loans by a corresponding amount. The reduction in the use of rela-
tively expensive capital means the expected consumption of late consumers
goes from 1=418 to 1=425= The improvement in risk sharing allows depositors’
expected utility to go from 0=173 to 0=174 while the insurance companies’
customers, the ﬁrms, remain at 0=624=
Table 2
17Banks Autarky CRT Insurance Autarky CRT
f1 11
f2KK 1=51 =541 F2KK 1=975 1=975
f2KO 1=51 =211 F2KO 1=125 1=251
f2OK 1=227 1=241 F2OK 1=975 1=929
f2OO 1=227 1=149 F2OO 1=125 1=086
Hf2 1=418 1=425 HF2 1=890 1=885
{ 0=50 =5 [ 0=50 =5
| 00 \ = cOK 00 =037
} 0=818 0=766 Insurance Partial Partial
h0 0=318 0=266 H0 00
HX 0=173 0=174 HY 0=624 0=624
One important aspect of this equilibrium is that banks do not use the long
a s s e ta ta l l .I td o e sn o th a v eah i g he n o u g hr e t u r nr e l a t i v et ol o a n st om a k e
it worth investing in. This means that when insurance companies liquidate
the asset at a low price when they go bankrupt, there is no contagion to the
banking sector.
Figure 1 summarizes the operation of the ﬁnancial system in the autarky
a n dw i t hb e n e ﬁcial credit risk transfer. Banks always raise funds from depos-
itors and investors and invest in the short term asset and loans. Firms with
damageable assets at date 1 buy partial insurance from the insurance com-
panies. In exchange for this insurance, ﬁrms pay a premium at date 0 and
invest the rest of their initial endowment in the long asset. In the autarky
equilibrium, the insurance companies invest the premiums they receive in
the short asset, and use the proceeds to meet claims at date 1. Since returns
to the short asset are technologically determined, there are no links between
the two sectors. Neither banks nor insurance companies ﬁnd it worthwhile
to use the long asset so the dotted lines in the ﬁgure are not operational.
The introduction of credit risk transfer modiﬁes the working of the ﬁ-
nancial system. To facilitate their ability to make a payout to the bank at
date 2, insurance companies also start to invest in the long asset, as the line
with short dashes in Figure 1 indicates. Banks choose not to invest in the
long asset and the line with long dashes between the bank sector and the
market for the long asset is not operative. There is no contagion between the
insurance sector and the banking sector, and credit risk transfer is beneﬁcial.
184 Detrimental credit risk transfer
So far credit risk transfer has been beneﬁcial because the two sectors hold
dierent assets and there is no contagion to the banking sector when the
insurance companies go bankrupt. However, if for some reason banks also
start to hold the long term asset, then there is potentially a problem. Banks
would be aected by the bankruptcy of the insurance sector and their sol-
vency might be threatened. In terms of Figure 1 the line with long dashes
between the banking sector and the long asset now becomes relevant.
To see how this can happen, we assume that, instead of all facing the same
risk, banks are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity risk. With probability 0=5
the proportion of their customers that are early consumers is l>l=1 >2> and
the proportion of late consumers is 1l with 1 A 2= There is no aggregate
uncertainty so 0=51 +0 =52 = = For simplicity, we assume 1 =1 > 2 =0 >
so these shocks are extreme. Either all of a bank’s depositors are early
consumers or they are all late consumers. Furthermore, the liquidity risk
that banks face is independent of the risk from the payos on their loans.
In this new framework, banks hold the long term asset and credit risk
transfer can reduce welfare. As before, the insurance companies are forced
to liquidate their holdings of the long asset at a low price when they go bank-
rupt. This now also implies a reduction in the price of the long asset which
banks use to hedge their liquidity risk. The banks that are selling the long
asset receive a lower amount and are unable to pay their depositors. Within
the equilibrium taking prices as given, it is optimal for banks and insurance
companies to undertake credit risk transfer. Nevertheless, comparing this
equilibrium with the autarkic one with no credit risk transfer, banks are
worse o and insurance companies are indierent.
Note that the insurance sector is not aected by the introduction of idio-
syncratic liquidity shocks for banks. Thus, the autarkic equilibrium in the
insurance sector is the same as in Section 3.2. We ﬁrst analyze the new oper-
ation of the autarkic banking sector, and consider what happens when credit
risk transfer is introduced.
4.1 The autarkic banking sector with idiosyncratic liq-
uidity shocks
We focus here on how the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks aect the banking
sector in autarky. It is initially assumed as a benchmark that there is no
19interbank market to allow banks to share liquidity risk and no capital for
banks. In this case banks only use the short asset. Then we introduce an
interbank market for the long asset which allows banks to hedge the risk
associated with the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks they face, and we show
banks start to use the long asset. Finally, we introduce capital and show
how this also helps the idiosyncratic liquidity risk to be shared. We maintain
throughout the assumption that loans cannot be liquidated.
4.1.1 No interbank market or bank capital
We initially suppose there is no interbank market so banks cannot sell the
long asset, and there is no capital so h0 =0 =
As before, banks maximize depositors’ expected utility so they choose to
invest { in the short asset, | in the long asset and } in loans to solve the
following problem:
Max 0=5X (f1)+0 =5[0=7X (f2K)+0 =3X (f2O)]










{ + |U+ }EO
1
.
T h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o ni st h es a m ea si n( 1 ) . T h ec o n s t r a i n t sa r et h ep e r
capita consumption of early consumers and of late consumers in states K
and O.N o t e t h a t t h e y d i er from the case of uniform liquidity shocks. In
aggregate there is always 1 unit of depositors. Of these, 0=5 turn out to be
early consumers and 0=5 are late consumers. A fraction 0=5 of the banks
has all their depositors be early consumers and the remaining 0=5 have all
their depositors be late consumers. The measures of the banks with early
consumers and of the early consumers are the same so each bank perceives
that it has either all depositors be early consumers with probability 0=5 or
all late consumers with probability 0=5. Since there is no interbank market,
banks have no opportunity for trade once the state is determined at date 1.
They can only use the assets they have at hand to repay depositors. This
implies banks can only give depositors f1 = {@1 from the short asset when
20they are all early consumers. When all depositors are late consumers, loans
pay o EK (EO) in states K (O) and consumers receive f2K = {+|U+}EK
(f2O = { + |U+ }EO).
The solution to the optimization problem is
{ =1 >|= } =0 >
f1 = f2K = f2O =1 >
HX =0 =
For the particular parameter values of the example, the payoso nt h e
long asset and the loans are not su!cient to compensate for the fact that
they are wasted when all the depositors withdraw early. The reason the long
asset and loans are wasted is there are no markets to liquidate them. As a
result, the optimal solution is for banks to only use the short asset.
4.1.2 An interbank market but no bank capital
We next introduce the possibility for banks to sell the long asset on an
interbank market at date 1 if they need to. Suppose the price of the long
asset in state l is Sl where l = K>O. Then banks having all early consuming
depositors sell their holdings of the long asset to obtain |Sl to pay out to
their depositors; while banks with all depositors being late consumers buy
{@Sl of the long asset. This implies each bank solves the following problem
at date 0:
Max 0=5[0=7X(f1K)+0 =3X(f1O)] + 0=5[0=7X(f2K)+0 =3X(f2O)] (9)
subject to (2) and




+ |)U + }El for l = K>O= (11)
The ﬁrst term in the objective function represents the 0=5 probability that
a bank’s depositors are all early consumers. With probability 0=7( 0 =3) the
bank’s holdings of the long asset, |> c a nb es o l df o rSK (SO) and depositors
receive f1K = { + |SK (f1O = { + |SO)= Loans are wasted because there is
no market for them. The second term in the objective function represents
21the 0=5 probability that all the bank’s depositors are late consumers. In this
case the bank uses its holdings of the short asset, {> to purchase {@Sl of the
long asset to add to its existing holdings of |= In addition depositors receive
the payos of the bank’s loans }El= Thus with probability 0=7( 0 =3) the late
depositors receive f2K =( {
SK + |)U + }EK (f2O =({
SO + |)U + }EO).
Since the proceeds from loans are wasted when all depositors turn out to
be early consumers, banks do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to hold loans. It is only
worth using the long asset and } =0 . This implies also that banks’ portfolios
do not bear any risk and SK = SO = S. The only equilibrium price is
S =1 =
In fact, if S?1 all banks would prefer the short asset between dates 0 and
1 and those with late depositors would attempt to buy the long asset at date
1. But this cannot be an equilibrium. There would be no supply of the
long asset at date 1 because all banks held the short asset between 0 and 1.
Similarly if SA1, all banks would hold the long asset between dates 0 and 1,
and the banks with early consumers would attempt to sell their holdings at
date 1. There would then be no demand so SA1 cannot be an equilibrium
price.
Given this pricing of the long asset, the optimal solution to the bank’s
problem is
{ = | =0 =5>}=0 ,
f1 =1 >f 2K = f2O =1 =25>
HX =0 =112=
The fact that the long asset can be sold in an interbank market means that
banks can use it to hedge their liquidity risk. If all their depositors are early
consumers, banks sell their holdings of the long asset and use the proceeds
together with their holdings of the short asset to pay their depositors. Any
holdings of loans would be wasted so they do not ﬁnd it worth holding these.
If all their depositors turn out to be late consumers, banks buy the long asset
and thus supply liquidity to the market.
4.1.3 An interbank market and bank capital
We now analyze the autarkic equilibrium of the banking sector when there is
an interbank market for liquidating the long asset and investors are willing
22to provide capital. Introducing capital now has two eects. As when banks
have uniform liquidity risks, capital allows late consuming depositors to share
some risk with investors and have higher expected utility. In addition to
this though, capital now prevents the waste of banks’ loans when all their
depositors want to consume early. Because they are risk neutral, investors
provide h0 of capital to the banks in return for a payo h2 at date 2. This
gives banks the possibility to use the proceeds of the loans to repay investors
and make it worth holding loans initially.
The bank’s problem is to maximize (9) subject to (6), (10), (11) with




+ |)U + }EK  h2> (12)
h0 =0 =5[0=7(}EK)+0 =3(}EO)] + 0=5 × 0=7 × h2= (13)
This problem is the same as in the case without capital except for the budget
constraint (??) being replaced with (6), which has capital included, and two
further constraints. The ﬁrst one, (12), is the per capita consumption of late
consuming depositors, and it diers from (11) with l = K because it now
allows for the payment h2 to the investors providing capital. The second
constraint, (13), is the investors’ participation constraint. To understand it,
recall that each bank faces a probability 0=5 that all its depositors become
early consumers and a probability 0=5 of having all late consuming depositors.
In the former case, the bank gives the proceeds of its loans to the investors.
Thus, investors receive payments }EK(}EO) with (conditional) probability
0=7( 0 =3),a st h eﬁrst terms on the right hand side of the constraint shows.
When all depositors are instead late consumers, the bank gives a payment
0=7×h2 to the providers of capital as 0=7 is the (conditional) probability that
loans pay o EK and the providers of capital are paid h2.
In this case the optimal solution is S =1as before and
{ = | =0 =459>}=0 =160>h 0 =0 =077>h 2 =0 >
f1 =0 =917>f 2K =1 =427>f 2O =1 =267>
HX =0 =117=
Dierently from the optimal solution without capital, it is now worth
investing in loans. The reason is that the investors receive the payosw h e n
the banks customers are early consumers and are willing to provide capital
as a result. Thus, loans are no longer wasted and their returns are now high
enough to induce banks to hold them.
234.2 Credit risk transfer
Now that we have considered the banking sector in autarky, we can analyze
the eects of credit risk transfer when banks face idiosyncratic liquidity risks.
The insurance sector remains the same as before. Given the risks in the two
sectors are independent, we have again four possible states with the following
payos.
Table 3
State Bank Late Insurance Firms Probability
loans depositors claims (%)
KK 1=75 1=427 50 1=975 0=63
KO 1=75 1=427 100 1=125 0=07
OK 0=75 1=267 50 1=975 0=27
OO 0=75 1=267 100 1=125 0=03
As before we focus on credit risk transfer where banks pay KO to insur-
ance companies in state KO, and insurance companies transfer OK to banks
in state OK. As before, it is assumed that banks gain the surplus created by
the credit risk transfer.
We ﬁrst consider whether, taking prices as given at the same levels as in
the autarkic solution, it is worth introducing credit risk transfer. With S =1
in all states as above, the optimal credit risk transfer has KO =0 =26.T h e
insurance companies invest cOK =0 =075 i nt h el o n ga s s e ta n dm a k eap a y m e n t
OK =0 =094. Depositors increase their expected utility to HX =0 =119,a n d
the ﬁrms’ owners have the same expected utility of HY =0 =624 as in autarky.
Thus, credit risk transfer increases welfare. This, however, cannot be an
equilibrium. The insurance companies invest in the long asset to fund the
transfer to the banks in state OK. In states KO and OO they go bankrupt
when the machines of all the ﬁrms they insure get damaged. They are forced
to liquidate the long asset, and markets no longer clear at S =1 .
We next solve for the equilibrium in this case. The most important feature
of this equilibrium is that there is contagion from the insurance sector to the
banking sector. The bankrupt insurance companies are forced to sell the long
asset in states KO and OO. These forced sales drive down the price of the
long asset. As a result, the banks that have early consumers and are selling
their holdings of the long asset to satisfy their liquidity needs are adversely
aected. They can no longer meet their commitments to the early consumers
and also go bankrupt. As we shall see, this leads to a Pareto reduction in
24welfare. The ﬁrst reason for this is that banks are unable to liquidate their
loans because there is no market for them. The second is that the bankrupt
banks lose out to the solvent ones, and this reallocation involves ine!cient
risk sharing.
Banks in this case solve the following optimization problem:
Max 0=5[0=9X (f1LK)+0 =1X(f1LO)]
+0=5[0=63X (f2KK)+0 =07X (f2KO)+0 =27X (f2OK)+0 =03X (f2OO)]
subject to (6),
h0 =0 =5×0=9×}(0=7EK+0=3EO)+0=5×0=27×cOK×U+0=5×0=63×h2> (14)
f1LK = { + |SLK>





























The objective function of the bank can be understood as follows. Each bank
has a 0=5 chance of having all early consuming depositors. The insurance
industry is in state K (O) with probability 0=9( 0 =1).B a n k s p r o v i d e c o n -
sumption to early consumers f1KK = f1OK = f1LK (f1KO = f1OO = f1LO) using
their holding { of the short asset and by selling the long asset | for SLK (SLO)
so that in total they oer f1LK = { + |SLK (f1LO = { + |SLO)= When banks
have all late consuming depositors, which occurs also with probability 0=5,
depositors’ payos depend on the state of both the banking and the insur-
ance sectors. In state KK, which occurs with probability 0=63, these banks
use their holding of the short asset to purchase {@SLK of the long asset at






}EK from their loans and pay out h2 to shareholders. The same happens
25in state KO, which occurs with probability 0=07, except that the price for
buying the long asset is SLO instead of SLK and banks pay KO to the insur-
ance companies as part of the credit risk transfer. In state OK,w h i c ho c c u r s
with probability 0=27,t h em a i nd i erence is that banks receive OK from the
insurance companies as part of the credit risk transfer. In state OO,w h i c h
occurs with probability 0=03, there is no credit risk transfer payment so late
consuming depositors just consume the returns from the long asset and the
loans.
The other constraints, (6) and (14), are the usual budget constraint at
date 0 with capital and the investors’ participation constraint. In the latter,
the ﬁrst term, 0=5 × 0=9 × }(0=7EK +0 =3EO)> represents the expected payo
investors receive when the bank has early consumers and the investors receive
the proceeds from the loans. The reason for the 0=9 is that this only happens
when the bank remains solvent. The remaining 0=1 of the time the bank
goes bankrupt and the loans are worth zero because there is no market for
liquidating them. The second term, 0=5 × 0=27 × cOK × U> is the expected
payo to investors when the bank has all early consumers and receives a
credit risk transfer from the insurance companies in state OK.T h e ﬁnal
term, 0=5 × 0=63 × h2, is the payment to the investors in state KK.
The method of ﬁnding the equilibrium now diers slightly from the previ-
ous cases. In particular, we now have to ﬁnd the equilibrium prices and the
solution to the maximization problem simultaneously rather than sequen-
tially. The reason is that there is “cash in the market pricing” in the market
for the long asset (see Allen and Gale, 2005b). The buyers of assets ﬁnd it
optimal to use all of their liquidity and the sellers supply all of their long
assets so the price is simply the ratio of the liquidity to the amount of the
long asset. To calculate it, we then need to know the total liquidity and
supply of the long asset in each state, and therefore the optimal values for
the transfers and the investments of both banks and insurance companies.
The optimal values for the transfers and cOK are
KO =0 =192>c OK =0 =053>OK =0 =066=
Given these values, Table 4 reports the full optimal solution for both banks
and insurance companies with credit risk transfer and in autarky for the
purpose of comparison.
Table 4
26Banks Autarky CRT Insurance Autarky CRT
f1LK 0=917 0=979
f1LO 0=917 0=892
f2KK 1=427 1=308 F2KK 1=975 1=975
f2KO 1=427 1=057 F2KO 1=125 1=294
f2OK 1=267 1=326 F2OK 1=975 1=909
f2OO 1=267 1=392 F2OO 1=125 1=102
Hf2 1=379 1=297 HF2 1=890 1=883
{ 0=459 0=489 [ 0=50 =5
| 0=459 0=489 \ = cOK 00 =053
} 0=160 0=049 Insurance Partial Partial
h0 0=077 0=027 H0 00
h2 00
HX 0=117 0=114 HY 0=624 0=624
The values of {, | and cOK determine the functioning of the market for
the long asset. Since { = | =0 =489 and cOK =0 =053,t h e0=5 banks that
have late consumers have liquidity 0=5 × 0=489 = 0=245 at date 1> while the
0=5 banks that have early consumers have 0=5 × 0=459 = 0=245 of the long
asset to sell. In states KK and OK insurance companies do not liquidate
their long asset and the equilibrium price is simply
SLK =1 =
In states KO and OO> in addition to the banks with early consuming
depositors, the bankrupt insurance companies sell 0=053 of the long asset,
thus increasing the supply in the market and reducing the price. The market





This price is too high to make it worthwhile for investors to provide liquidity
to the market as in the case where banks face uniform liquidity shocks, but
a tt h es a m et i m ei ti sl o we n o u g ht om a k ea l s ob a n k sw i t he a r l yc o n s u m i n g
depositors go bankrupt in states KO and OO.
As a result, the equilibrium with credit risk transfer can be Pareto worse
than autarky. As Table 4 shows, the customers of insurance companies ob-
tain the same expected utility of 0=624 in both cases. Banks’ depositors
obtain 0=117 in autarky and only 0=114 with credit risk transfer. Within the
27latter equilibrium, taking prices as given, banks’ depositors will only obtain
expected utility of 0=107 if they do not engage in credit risk transfer so it is
deﬁnitely worth them undertaking it. Depositors are worse o with credit
risk transfer because of the ine!cient liquidation of the long asset due to the
contagion and the poor risk sharing between banks with early consumers and
banks with late consumers. The banks with early consumers go bankrupt
and are forced to sell their long asset cheaply. The banks with late consumers
make a proﬁt from buying the long asset cheaply. This is bad from an ex
ante point of view because the early consumers have the lowest consumption
a n dt h e ya r et h eo n e sl o s i n go u t .
Figure 1 illustrates the key point of the equilibrium with credit risk trans-
fer when banks face idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Without credit risk transfer
only banks hold the long asset and they trade it on the interbank market to
hedge against liquidity risk. The introduction of credit risk transfer induces
the insurance companies to use the long asset as well. This means the two
sectors are linked through the market as the dotted lines to the long asset
market indicate. The fall in prices caused by the liquidation of insurance
companies’ long assets result in contagion to the banking sector. The banks
that are forced to liquidate their long assets to meet their liquidity needs go
bankrupt.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has shown that credit risk transfer can be beneﬁcial because it
improves risk sharing. However, it can also induce contagion and lead to a
Pareto reduction in welfare. Financial innovation can thus have somewhat
unexpected results. It is necessary to consider all the systemic eects when
deciding whether or not it is beneﬁcial.
T h ee x a m p l e sp r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e rw e r ed e v e l o p e di nt h ec o n t e x to f
banking and insurance. Despite the recent rapid growth in credit risk trans-
fer shown in Table 1, a comparison of the outstanding amounts of credit risk
transfer instruments with the total outstanding amounts of bank credit and
corporate debt securities shows that they remain small in relative terms. Al-
though credit risk transfer may not pose a systemic problem at the moment,
it may do in the future as it continues to grow in importance. Perhaps more
i m p o r t a n ti st h a tt h i sk i n do fa n a l y s i si sa p p l i c a b l ei nm a n yd i erent con-
texts. The interaction of incomplete markets and the role of liquidity in asset
28pricing are the key factors for the contagion across sectors. These elements
can occur in the context of many ﬁnancial institutions. Hedge funds have
become increasingly important in many markets. They potentially provide
a conduit for contagion across many illiquid markets.
We have assumed very simple contractual forms in the insurance indus-
try. More complex contractual forms such as incorporating junior and senior
policyholders to allow some claims to be met in the bad state would improve
the allocation of resources. However, provided it is not possible to contract
around bankruptcy completely, similar results to ours should still hold.
This paper has focused on the private provision of liquidity in markets and
has not analyzed the role of central banks in liquidity provision. In markets
with limited participation it is likely that central banks will have problems
injecting liquidity into the ﬁnancial system that will reach the required mar-
kets and prevent the kind of contagion considered here. The justiﬁcation
used by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for their intervention in ar-
ranging a private sector bailout of Long Term Capital Management in 1998
explicitly used this rationale. The issue of what the precise role of central
banks in this kind of situations should be is an interesting question for future
research.
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32Table 1: Size of Credit Risk Transfer Markets (in billions of US $)
Instrument 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Loan trading (turnover)
- US Market 34 40 61 78 79 102 118 1171
(Loan Pricing Corporation)
Credit Derivatives (outstanding)
- BIS triennial survey 108 693
-U SO C C 2 144 287 426 395 4923
- British Bankers Association 180 350 586 893 1,189 1,9524
- Risk Magazine 810 1,398
-I S D A 919 1,6004
Asset-backed securities
- US market (outstanding) 315 403 517 684 816 947 1,114 1,2586
(Bond Market Association)5
- European market (issuance)
(Moody’s)7 68 80 134 508
- Australian market (outstanding) 7 10 15 19 27 33 38 54
(Australian Bureau of Statistics)
Collateralised debt obligations
- US market (outstanding) 1 1 19 48 85 125 167 2326
(Bond Market Association)
- European market (issuance)
(Moody’s) 42 71 114 708
Total bank credit 23,424 23,576 23,309 26,018 26,904 27,221 27,442 29,4359
(outstanding)10
-I M F
Corporate debt securities11 3,241 3,373 3,444 4,042 4,584 4,939 5,233 5,5059
(outstanding)
-B I S
Footnotes: 1First three quarters of 2002, annualised. 2Holdings of US commercial banks. 3
Second Quarter of 2002. 4Forecast for 2002. 5Excluding CB)os/CDOs. 6 September 2002. 7
ABSs and MBSs. 8First half of 2002. 9 June 2002. 10 Domestic and international credit to
non-bank borrowers (United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Euro area). 11 Debt
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